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NOTES 
AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH TO OBSCENITY 
IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
RYAN J. ADAMS† 
INTRODUCTION 
Philosopher Bertrand Russell once quipped, “Obscenity is 
whatever happens to shock some elderly and ignorant 
magistrate.”1  Although Russell was an Englishman,2 he 
highlights a problem that has plagued American obscenity 
doctrine for decades: subjectivity in definition.3  The current 
standard for obscenity, as set forth by the Supreme Court in 
Miller v. California,4 has been the subject of criticism for years, 
but is now, according to some critics, an anachronism.5  The 
Miller test for obscenity looks to three factors: 
(a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards’ would find that the work, taken as a 
whole, appeals to the prurient interest, (b) whether the work 
 
† Senior Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., 2012, St. John’s University 
School of Law; B.A., 2008, Loyola College. I would like to thank my parents, 
colleagues, and all the wonderful professors who have taught me over the years. 
1 Thoughts on the Business Life, FORBES, Dec. 10, 1990, at 328. 
2 RAY MONK, BERTRAND RUSSELL: THE SPIRIT OF SOLITUDE, 1872-1921, at 4 
(1996). 
3 See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (Harlan, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he intractable obscenity 
problem.”). See also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22 (“[N]o majority of the Court 
has at any given time been able to agree on a standard to determine what 
constitutes obscene, pornographic material subject to regulation under the States’ 
police power.”). 
4 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
5 See Dennis W. Chiu, Comment, Obscenity on the Internet: Local Community 
Standards for Obscenity are Unworkable on the Information Superhighway, 36 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 185, 204, 215 (1995) (noting that “[w]hen Miller was decided in 
1974, the nation had yet to widely use much of the modern telecommunications 
equipment we have today” and arguing that “[t]he existence of local community 
standards has either become extinct or is about to enter extinction because of 
society’s growing interconnectedness”). 
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depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct 
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether 
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value.6 
While criticisms of Miller are legion, this Note devotes itself 
to the peculiarities of the first prong.  As interpreted, the first 
prong of this test means a “local community standard,” rather 
than a larger, national standard.  Indeed, the Miller opinion 
declared that a “national” standard would be “unascertainable.”7  
The prevalence of Internet pornography and its technical nature, 
however, have created a landscape vastly different from the 
pornography of Miller.  When Miller was decided, in 1973, 
pornography was distributed mostly by mail-order or brick and 
mortar shops.  Today, the overwhelming majority of pornography 
is distributed through a medium that was far from the 
contemplation of the justices in Miller: the Internet.  The 
widespread adoption of the Internet as the primary means for 
transmitting pornography has changed not only the business of 
pornography, but how it is viewed in society. 
Over the past decade, hardcore pornography has enjoyed an 
unprecedented degree of cross-over mainstream success.  Adult 
film stars now feature in mainstream television and movies,8 and 
explicit pornographic DVDs and magazines are available at 
convenience stores nationwide.  This may be due to the sheer 
volume of pornography on the Internet, and the ease of 
accessibility.  Simply put, pornography is more prevalent, 
accessible, and popular than ever.9  Now that Internet networks 
 
6 Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (internal citations omitted). 
7 Id. at 31. 
8 For instance, adult film star Sasha Grey recently appeared in Academy Award 
winning Director Steven Soderbergh’s The Girlfriend Experience. See THE 
GIRLFRIEND EXPERIENCE (Magnolia Pictures 2009); see also DAVID FOSTER 
WALLACE, Big Red Son, in CONSIDER THE LOBSTER 3 (2006). 
9  See Press Release, Optenet, More Than One Third of Web Pages Are 
Pornographic (June 16, 2010), available at http://www.optenet.com/en-
us/new.asp?id=270 (indicating that more than a third of websites on the internet are 
pornographic); Statistics on Pornography, Sexual Addiction, and Online 
Perpetrators, SAFE FAMILIES, http://www.safefamilies.org/sfStats.php (last visited 
Apr. 5, 2012) (“More than 70% of men from 18 to 34 visit a pornographic site in a 
typical month.”); Jason Palmer, Porn Putting on its Sunday Best, BBC NEWS, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7845561.stm (last updated Jan. 23, 2009) 
(analyzing relationship between social networking websites and pornography 
websites); One in 10 Men Surf the Internet for Porn - and 40% of Those Peek at Saucy 
Pictures While Their Partner is in the Next Room, DAILY MAIL (Nov. 10, 2010, 7:54 
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increasingly use high speed broadband connections, streaming 
video technology has grown, and hours of sexually explicit 
material are available to millions of people within seconds.10 
The shift to Internet-based distribution models makes the 
criteria under which obscenity is measured, Miller’s local 
“contemporary community standards,”11 unworkable, non-
probative, and anachronistic.  It is impossible to ascertain a 
“local community” for material on the Internet, a global network.  
This issue has been taken up not only by numerous 
commentators,12 but by courts as well.13  In particular, many 
have argued for a standard that takes into account the 
“community” of the Internet, or a uniform “national” standard.14  
But Internet community standards pose problems as well 
because the community of the Internet is geographically 
boundless.  It comprises a truly global network.  The Miller “local 
 
AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1328369/1-10-men-surf-internet-porn-
40-partner-room.html (noting that 1 in 10 men surf the internet for pornography, 
and noting that 8 percent of surveyed males responded that they use the Internet 
primarily to view pornography); Dan Ackman, How Big is Porn ?, FORBES (May 25, 
2001, 1:45 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2001/05/25/0524porn.html (analyzing 
different valuations of the pornography industry, all in multiple billions of dollars). 
10 And it is often free to the dismay of traditional publishers and brick and 
mortar stores. Studies indicate that at least five of the top one hundred websites in 
America are “portals for free pornography.” Sites like these attract more users than 
TMZ and Huffington Post, and even overshadow traditional mainstays of the illegal 
downloading community. See Ben Fritz, Tough Times in the Porn Industry, L.A. 
TIMES, Aug. 10, 2009, at B1 (describing the prevalence of free, online streaming 
pornography sites). These sites make most of their revenue in advertising and 
traffic, and have affected the overall pornography industry. See id. Old school 
powerhouses such as Vivid Entertainment report revenues down by at least 20%, a 
figure that correlates directly to attendance at trade show events. Id.; see also 
WALLACE, supra note 8. 
11 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
12 See, e.g., Chiu, supra note 5, at 188. 
13 See, e.g., United States v. Little, 365 F. App’x 159, 162–63 (11th Cir. 2010); see 
also United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1251 (9th Cir. 2009). 
14 See Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1250–56; see also Anne Wells Branscomb, 
Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to the First Amendment in 
Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1656, 1672 (1995) (noting that a virtual 
community standard could be a solution to the obscenity problem); William D. 
Deane, Comment, COPA and Community Standards on the Internet: Should the 
People of Maine and Mississippi Dictate the Obscenity Standard in Las Vegas and 
New York?, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 245, 292, 294–95 (2001) (arguing for a “virtual 
community standard”); Patrick T. Egan, Note, Virtual Community Standards: 
Should Obscenity Law Recognize the Contemporary Community Standard of 
Cyberspace?, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 117, 150–51 (1996) (arguing for the adoption of 
a “virtual community standard”). 
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community standards” test has become problematic for at least 
three reasons.  First, the current test encourages forum 
shopping.15  Second, the test is too subjective.16  How is one to 
determine what these relevant standards are?  What size is the 
community one looks to?  Third, and directly related to the 
problem of the most restrictive community, Miller has the 
potential to chill free speech.17  Pornography is only illegal when 
it has been defined as such, making obscenity little more than a 
legal conclusion.  A pornographer in California has no way of 
knowing whether her conduct is criminally obscene to someone in 
Florida, and therefore is likely to not assert her rights at all.  
This is unfair because she is limited by the unknown—she cannot 
know the bounds of her legal rights.  Moreover, she has done 
nothing to force her material upon Floridians, but is being 
pursued by over-vigilant prosecutors.18 
As a result of these problems, courts are now reconsidering 
Miller.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. 
Kilbride,19 recently held that a “national community standards” 
test should apply to Internet pornography.20  The Ninth Circuit’s 
adoption of a “national community standards” test is a step in the 
right direction.  It alleviates the problems of forum shopping and 
chilled speech, and acknowledges the Internet as a medium 
which transcends local borders.21  While the Ninth Circuit 
approach should be lauded for recognizing that Miller is 
unworkable in the modern age, its “national standards” test 
poses many of the same problems of Miller.  For example, the  
 
 
15 See infra Part II.B. 
16 See infra Part II.C. 
17 See infra Part II.D. 
18 Debra D. Burke, Thinking Outside the Box: Child Pornography, Obscenity and 
the Constitution, 8 VA. J.L. & TECH. 11, 37 (2003) (“[I]t is difficult for the sender to 
appreciate the standards for patent offensiveness of a distant community, or even to 
block access to would-be recipients in less tolerant communities.”). 
19 584 F.3d 1240. 
20 Id. at 1254 (“[A] national community standard must be applied in regulating 
obscene speech on the Internet . . . .”). 
21 While this recognition of the problem of Miller vis-à-vis the Internet may 
mark a new approach to obscenity jurisprudence, the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals declined to follow this interpretation shortly after in United States v. Little, 
365 F. App’x 159, 164 (11th Cir. 2010) (“We decline to follow the reasoning of 
Kilbride in this Circuit. . . . [T]he Miller contemporary community standard remains 
the standard by which the Supreme Court has directed us to judge obscenity, on the 
Internet and elsewhere.”). 
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“national standards” test suffers from vagueness and 
subjectivity.  Because the national standard fails to address the 
concern of subjectivity, it ultimately fails. 
This Note proposes a new approach that borrows from the 
Eighth Amendment’s “evolving standards of decency” test.  While 
not a complete departure in methodology from the Miller test, the 
language of “evolving standards of decency” would lend 
objectivity in a legal analysis of obscenity.  The Eighth 
Amendment approach, which is similar in language and meaning 
to “contemporary community standards,” looks to objective 
indications for evidence of contemporary societal values.22  
Because the Internet is a protean medium, and the punishment 
of obscenity is rooted in criminal law, this approach can lend 
necessary guidance to an obscenity analysis.  Moreover, “evolving 
standards of decency” has been used explicitly to determine a 
national consensus.23  It is not only applicable to the Eighth 
Amendment, but has been employed in recent decisions in the 
context of sexual privacy, as well.24  
Using an Eighth Amendment framework also opens the 
analysis to international law,25 which is compelling, considering 
the Internet is a global medium.  Although international 
comparisons have been criticized by scholars and the bench, most 
of these criticisms are aimed at the lack of guiding criteria in 
international analysis.26  Implementing an objective methodology 
in determining which countries to compare can reduce 
 
22 The Eighth Amendment offers protection against “cruel and unusual 
punishment[].” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Supreme Court has analyzed whether 
punishment exceeds the Eighth Amendment by looking to “the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 
101 (1958). The standards of society are to be determined by looking to “objective 
factors to the maximum possible extent.” Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000 
(1991) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980)).  
23 See infra Part IV.B. 
24 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 564 (2003). Further, there may be 
an argument in the fact that Lawrence essentially holds that morality is never a 
legitimate government interest. This would argue for allowing obscene material to 
be protected by the First Amendment, a position that this author leaves for others, 
and does not think the Supreme Court will support anytime soon. 
25 See infra Part IV.D. 
26 See David M. O’Brien, More Smoke than Fire: The Rehnquist Court’s Use of 
Comparative Judicial Opinions and Law in the Construction of Constitutional 
Rights, 22 J.L. & POL. 83, 93 (2006) (“Another standard that has invited the use of 
foreign legal sources . . . is that of the ‘evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of [our] maturing society’ when interpreting the Eighth Amendment’s ban 
on ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ vis-à-vis the death penalty.”). 
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subjectivism.  In particular, this Note proposes using Professor 
Geert Hofstede’s seminal study on multinational cultural values, 
Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, 
Institutions, and Organizations Across Nations,27 (“Hofstede 
Study”) to identify countries with similar moral values to 
America, making them relevant for comparison.  The varying 
indices Hofstede employs create a substantially diverse cross 
section of values, normalizing the analysis.  Using the Hofstede 
Study to identify countries that are similar to America in a 
variety of cultural indices can provide a varied, yet methodical, 
guideline for selecting countries against which to compare 
American law.  This, in effect, creates a guided “international 
community” for analysis, while avoiding extreme outliers.28 
This Note argues for an objective approach to international 
comparative law using the Hofstede Study as a guideline.  Part I 
charts the modern history of obscenity jurisprudence, starting 
with Miller and going up to the current circuit split.  Part II 
analyzes the problems of Miller and its progeny.  Part III briefly 
considers the problems of the Ninth Circuit’s “national 
community” approach, applying arguments from Part II.  Finally, 
Part IV identifies a methodology derived from the Eighth 
Amendment’s “evolving standards of decency” test which uses 
objective criteria to guide the development of a national standard 
which is informed by international law. 
I. “I KNOW IT WHEN I SEE IT. . . .” A BRIEF HISTORY OF 
OBSCENITY LAW IN AMERICA 
First Amendment freedoms are among the most prized 
rights of United States citizens.  The First Amendment provides 
that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press.”29  This right is incorporated to the 
individual States by the Fourteenth Amendment and judicial 
interpretation.  Despite the relatively straightforward language 
of the Amendment, the Supreme Court has carved out different 
categories of “speech,” some protected by the Amendment, and 
 
27 See generally GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES: COMPARING 
VALUES, BEHAVIORS, INSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS ACROSS NATIONS (2d ed. 
2001). 
28 Some attempts have been made to define a relevant “virtual” or “Internet” 
community. This Note does not attempt this. 
29 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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others not.30  Among the unprotected categories of speech are the 
“lewd and obscene.”31  While this categorical approach sounds 
simple enough, defining what is “obscene” has proven to be an 
arduous, if not Sisyphean, task.32 
This section analyzes this history and problems of defining 
“obscenity” in American jurisprudence.  Part I.A notes the lead 
up to Miller v. California, and then examines that case and the 
introduction of the modern obscenity test.  Part I.B highlights 
how the first prong of the Miller test has been interpreted, 
specifically noting that it does not utilize a “national” standard.  
Part I.C briefly explores how Miller has been used in the Internet 
age.  Part I.D analyzes the Ninth Circuit’s eschewal of Miller as 
applied to the Internet in United States v. Kilbride, and explores 
the court’s analysis in doing so.  Part I.E further explores the 
court’s analysis in Kilbride, specifically looking at the Ninth 
Circuit’s use of Supreme Court precedent in its decision.   
A. Miller v. California 
In the 1964 Supreme Court case Jacobellis v. Ohio,33 Justice 
Stewart declared that defining obscenity was something that he 
could “never succeed in intelligibly doing.”34  In the same case, 
Stewart devised a decidedly non-scientific test to identify hard-
core pornography:  “I know it when I see it.”35   
In the hopes of elaborating upon this imprecise standard, the 
Court re-examined the standard for obscenity in the case of 
Miller v. California.36  The defendant in Miller was convicted by a 
jury for violating section 311.2(a) of the California Penal Code37 
for “knowingly distributing obscene matter.”38  The defendant 
 
30 See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (holding 
certain classes of speech as unprotected). 
31 Id. at 572. 
32 See United States v. Little, 365 F. App’x 159, 163 (11th Cir. 2010); United 
States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1250 (9th Cir. 2009). 
33 378 U.S. 184 (1964). 
34 Id. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
35 Id. 
36 See 413 U.S. 15, 16 (1973) (referring to “the intractable . . . problem” (quoting 
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (Harlan, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part))). 
37 See id. at 18 (noting that the relevant statute provided that “ ‘[o]bscene’ 
means that to the average person, applying contemporary standards, the 
predominant appeal of the matter, taken as a whole, is to prurient interest”). 
38 Id. at 16. 
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had a business of mass mailing advertisements for adult books,39 
and found himself arrested, charged with distribution of obscene 
material, and convicted of a misdemeanor, when an elderly 
woman received graphic and unsolicited brochures.40  
Acknowledging flaws in the Court’s obscenity doctrine, and 
perhaps alluding to Justice Stewart’s test, the Miller Court 
aimed to “formulate standards more concrete than those in the 
past.”41  The Court stated that “no majority of the Court has at 
any given time been able to agree on a standard to determine 
what constitutes obscene, pornographic material subject to 
regulation.”42  It could agree only that this area of law was in 
flux.43 
Needing a workable standard, the Court devised the current 
test to determine whether a work was obscene.  The Court 
decided that juries must look to: 
(a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards’ would find that the work, taken as a 
whole, appeals to the prurient interest, (b) whether the work 
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct 
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether 
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value.44 
B. Contemporary Community Standards Are Not Judged by a 
National Community 
Having set forth a test for obscenity, the Court then had to 
clarify it.  Turning to the “contemporary community standards” 
prong of its test, the Court concluded that a national standard 
could not apply to obscenity law.45  The Court cited diversity of 
nationhood and state government as a primary reason for not 
articulating a national standard.46  Moreover, the Court feared 
 
39 The Court referred to this as “euphemistically called ‘adult’ material.” Id. 
40 See id. at 16–18 (“[A] situation in which sexually explicit materials have been 
thrust by aggressive sales action upon unwilling recipients who had in no way 
indicated any desire to receive such materials.”). 
41 Id. at 20. 
42 Id. at 22. 
43 See id. at 23 (“This is an area in which there are few eternal verities.”). 
44 Id. at 24 (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972) (per curiam)). 
45 See id. at 30 (“[T]his does not mean that there are, or should or can be, fixed, 
uniform national standards . . . .”). 
46 See id. 
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that a national standard would be overly abstract.47  This 
sentiment was not new; Chief Justice Warren in Jacobellis v. 
Ohio argued that a national standard would not be provable.48  
Drawing further on history, the Court looked to the tradition of 
allowing jurors to “draw on the standards of their community” for 
evidence of standards.49  The Court ultimately held that “[i]t is 
neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First 
Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi 
accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, 
or New York City.”50  
C. Community Standards into the Information Age 
As applied, the Miller test has come to mean the standards 
of regional communities, which can be rather provincial.51  
Subsequently, courts have uniformly held that obscenity should 
be judged by the standards of a local county.52  In the modern era, 
however, many have argued against the application of Miller to 
Internet pornography, urging for a broader standard.53  
Courts have been loath to adopt a broader standard.  An oft-
cited example of the current standard for Internet pornography is 
seen in the influential decision of United States v. Thomas.54  In 
Thomas, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether 
the geographic intangibility of the Internet necessitated a 
national standard for the first prong of the Miller test.55  In what 
could have been a step forward in recognizing the unique 
 
47 See id. (“[I]t would be unrealistic to require that the answer be based on some 
abstract formulation.”). 
48 378 U.S. 184, 200 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (“I believe that there is no 
provable ‘national standard’ . . . . At all events, this Court has not been able to 
enunciate one, and it would be unreasonable to expect local courts to divine one.”). 
49 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 30. Although this raises separate questions of 
introducing evidence and expert testimony. 
50 Id. at 32. 
51 Matthew Towns, Note, The Community Standards of Utah and the Amish 
Country Rule the World Wide Web, 68 MO. L. REV. 735, 735 (2003) (describing 
communities as “usually smaller than a single state”). 
52 See, e.g., United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merch., Schedule No. 
2102, 709 F.2d 132, 135–37 (2d Cir. 1983) (applying New York City’s standard). 
53 See, e.g., Mark Cenite, Federalizing or Eliminating Online Obscenity Law as 
an Alternative to Contemporary Community Standards, 9 COMM. L. & POL’Y 25, 25–
27 (2004). But see Burke, supra note 18 (“[T]he application of the least tolerant 
community standards is the safest route . . . .”). 
54 74 F.3d 701, 711 (6th Cir. 1996). 
55 Id. 
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characteristics of the Internet, the court failed and held that the 
standard of a local Tennessee community should apply.56  The 
court refused to address defendants’ claim that the unique 
attributes of the Internet required a new definition of 
“community.”57  This view has been consistently upheld since.58 
D. Toward a New Standard: The Ninth Circuit Adopts a 
National Obscenity Standard in United States v. Kilbride 
Recently, in the 2009 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case 
United States v. Kilbride,59 the Ninth Circuit carved a new path 
in the jurisprudence of obscenity, holding that a “national 
community standards” test should apply to obscenity charges 
arising from Internet pornography.  The case dealt with the 
prosecution of Californian defendants who were in the business 
of sending unsolicited, pornographic emails.60  Defendants were 
prosecuted under a federal Anti-Spam Act61 and charged with 
various offenses, including obscenity. 
At trial, the District Court opened the door for a national 
standard, stating that “community standards is a broader 
inquiry . . . [that should be made] in the light of contemporary 
standards that would be applied by the average adult person in 
the community.”62  While at first blush this sounds like the Miller 
test, the court went on to say, “Contemporary community 
standards are set by what is in fact accepted in the community as 
a whole; that is to say by society at large . . . and not merely by 
what the community tolerates nor by what some persons or 
groups of persons may believe . . . .”63  Moreover, the court 
instructed the jury that “ ‘community’ . . . is not defined by a 
precise geographic area.  You may consider evidence of standards 
existing in places outside of this particular district.”64  Little 
 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 See United States v. Little, 365 F. App’x 159, 164 (11th Cir. 2010). 
59 584 F.3d 1240, 1250 (9th Cir. 2009). 
60 United States v. Kilbride, 507 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1055 (D. Ariz. 2007) (Kilbride 
I). This fact pattern is rather similar to Miller where defendants were from 
California, and were prosecuted for distributing unsolicited pornographic mail. See 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 16–18 (1973). 
61 Kilbride I, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 1055. 
62 Id. at 1069. 
63 Id. (emphasis added). 
64 Id.  
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instruction was given on how this standard might be achieved, 
nor was any mention made of the potential lack of objective 
evidence of such standards.  Defendants were convicted of fraud 
and conspiracy to commit fraud in connection with electronic 
mail, interstate transportation and sale of obscene materials, and 
conspiracy to commit money laundering.65  
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
considered this instruction.  Defendants argued that the district 
court erred in its jury instructions on the matter.66  Defendants 
focused on the meaning of “contemporary community standards,” 
and argued that error lay in the expansion to “communities 
beyond their own . . . or of a global community.”67  Defendants 
had two specific objections.  First, they objected to the language 
used by the district, “that is to say by society at large, or people 
in general,” as an improper expansion of Miller.68  Second, they 
objected to jury instructions that, “[t]he ‘community’ you should 
consider in deciding these questions is not defined by a precise 
geographic area,” arguing that this imprecise definition was 
improper.69  According to the defendants, the district court 
neither complied with the proper Miller test, nor complied with a 
national definition.70  The court instead created a vague middle 
ground. 
The Court of Appeals found no error in either of these 
instructions.71  In reaching this conclusion, the court relied in 
part on Hamling v. United States,72 noting, “that the relevant 
community lacks a precise geographic definition follows directly 
from Hamling’s holding that the relevant community is not to be 
geographically defined in federal obscenity prosecutions, 
permitting the jury to apply their own sense . . . based on their 
own community,” to rebuke the defendants’ argument that a 
clear geographic definition must be given.73  Further, the court 
 
65 See United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009). 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 1247. 
68 Id. at 1248 (emphasis omitted).  
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 1247. 
71 Id. at 1248 (“We conclude, applying the prevailing definition of contemporary 
community standards put forth in Hamling, that the challenged portions do not 
constitute prejudicial error.”). 
72 418 U.S. 87, 104–05 (1974). 
73 Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1248 (citing Hamling, 418 U.S. at 104–05). 
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cited Hamling as support for “the entirely logical proposition that 
evidence of standards of communities outside the district may in 
a court’s judgment help jurors gauge what their own sense of 
contemporary community standards are.”74  The court also held 
that “[t]he instruction’s references to ‘society at large’ and ‘people 
in general’ are also not objectionable” to rebut defendants’ 
argument that an improper expansion of Miller was given.75  
The Ninth Circuit based its rationale on the reasoning of 
Supreme Court cases involving obscenity, community standards, 
and the Internet.  First, it looked to Reno v. ACLU,76 a case 
where the Supreme Court invalidated provisions of the 
Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) as facially overbroad in 
violation of the First Amendment.77  The court focused largely 
though on the “fractured decision”78 in Ashcroft v. ACLU,79 a 2002 
Supreme Court case. 
In Ashcroft, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of the 
Child Online Privacy Act (“COPA”), a law similar to the CDA.80  
Before reaching the Supreme Court, the Third Circuit held that 
COPA was facially overbroad because it identified material 
“harmful to minors” by a contemporary community standards 
test.81  This was problematic according to the Third Circuit 
because “[w]eb publishers are without any means to limit access 
to their sites based on the geographic location of particular 
Internet users.”82  The Supreme Court vacated this judgment, 
holding that COPA’s reference to “contemporary community 
standards” in defining what was harmful to minors did not alone  
 
 
74 Id. at 1249. 
75 Id.  
76 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
77 See id. at 877–79. The contended CDA provisions attempted to regulate 
obscene content on the Internet relying on “contemporary community standards” 
analogous to the Miller test. The Court, in finding the regulation overbroad, wrote, 
“[T]he community standards criterion as applied to the Internet means that any 
communication available to a nation wide audience will be judged by the standards 
of the community most likely to be offended by the message.” Id. at 877–78 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
78 Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1252. 
79 535 U.S. 564, 566 (2002). 
80 See Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1252 (noting that COPA was a successor to the 
CDA). 
81 ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 173–74 (3d Cir. 2000), vacated sub nom., 
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002). 
82 Id. at 175. 
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render COPA unconstitutionally overbroad, but in plurality 
addressed the issue of the “contemporary community standards” 
test.83  
In a concurrence, Justice O’Connor wrote that “this case still 
leaves open the possibility that the use of local community 
standards will cause problems for regulation of obscenity on the 
Internet.”84  According to O’Connor, “given Internet speakers’ 
inability to control the geographic location of their audience, 
expecting them to bear the burden of controlling the 
recipients . . . may be entirely too much to ask . . . .”85  Moreover, 
O’Connor explicitly urged that adopting a national standard 
would be “necessary . . . for any reasonable regulation of Internet 
obscenity.”86 
Justice Breyer took a similar view in concurrence.  He 
agreed that the local community standard would impose the most 
stringent regulations, and would “provide the most puritan of 
communities with a heckler’s Internet veto affecting the rest of 
the Nation.”87  He then interpreted COPA as applying a national 
standard.88  The remaining Justices agreed with Kennedy, who 
agreed with O’Connor and Breyer that “national variation in 
community standards constitutes a particular burden on Internet 
speech” but did not see the need to apply this as a new 
standard.89  Justice Stevens, the lone dissenter, argued that 
recognition of a national standard would not solve any problems 
because it would produce varied and inconsistent outcomes.90 
In Kilbride, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the plurality 
holding in Ashcroft could be properly viewed as the “narrowest 
grounds” of decision and therefore, as good law.91  Because 
 
83 See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 580–81, 586. 
84 Id. at 587 (O’Connor, J., concurring). But see id. at 577–79, 584–85 (plurality 
opinion) (stating that “the variance in community standards across the country 
could still cause juries in different locations to reach inconsistent conclusions as to 
whether a particular work is ‘harmful to minors,’ ” but not finding a problem in this 
case because COPA was narrower than the CDA). 
85 Id. at 587 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
86 Id. at 587. 
87 Id. at 590 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
88 Id. at 591. 
89 Id. at 597 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
90 Id. at 607 n.3. 
91 United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1253–54 (9th Cir. 2009) (“When a 
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys 
the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position 
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Justice O’Connor’s and Breyer’s views were narrower than 
Thomas’s and Kennedy’s, the Ninth Circuit held that these 
“narrower” views applied.  Moreover, the court held that “the 
Court has never held that a jury may in no case be instructed to 
apply a national community standard in finding obscenity.”92  It 
therefore ultimately held that a national standard should be 
applied to Internet obscenity for the same reasons as identified in 
Ashcroft.93  
II. THE PROBLEM WITH MILLER 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Kilbride should be lauded as 
a step in the right direction, primarily because the traditional 
Miller test has become anachronistic.  In light of modern 
obscenity prosecutions, the community standards prong of the 
Miller test is problematic for three reasons: (1) it encourages 
forum shopping; (2) it is vague and subjective; (3) and it is likely 
to chill free speech.  These problems derive from a basic truth, 
that the Internet is wholly different from previous mediums in 
physical structure and potential scope.  The Ninth Circuit’s 
decision was based upon this in part.94  This Section analyzes 
these problems.  Part II.A describes the intrinsic inapplicability 
of the Miller test to the Internet, primarily focusing on how the 
technology that comprises the Internet is different from 
traditional print media, upon which Miller was founded.  Part 
II.B describes the potential for abuse under Miller, showing how 
forum shopping is encouraged by Miller.  Part II.C describes 
problems with Miller itself, notably how the language of the test  
 
 
taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest 
grounds.’ ”) (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)). 
92 Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1254. But see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30 (1973) 
(“To require a State to structure obscenity proceedings around evidence of a national 
‘community standard’ would be an exercise in futility.”). 
93 Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1255 (“[O]ur holding today follows directly from a 
distillation of the various opinions in Ashcroft . . . .”). Although the Ninth Circuit 
was correct in identifying the need for a new approach to obscenity, most courts have 
not followed suit. See, e.g., United States v. Little, 365 F. App’x 159 (11th Cir. 2010). 
In Little, the court explicitly declined to follow Kilbride, instead sticking to Miller. 
Id. at 164. 
94 Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1253 (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 590 
(2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“The technical difficulties associated with efforts to 
confine Internet material to particular geographic areas make the problem 
particularly serious.”)). 
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is vague, and leads to subjective interpretation.  Part II.D 
describes how Miller has the potential to chill free speech, 
narrowing the rights of citizens. 
A. The Internet is Fundamentally Different from Print 
The technology of the Internet is remarkable in its growth 
and capacity to deliver content to users, which has been quite 
lucrative for the pornography industry.95  Streaming video 
technology has led to a monumental expansion of pornography.96  
In 2006, there were approximately 4.2 million pornographic 
websites.97  This number accounted for 12% of total websites on 
the Internet, and “every second, there are as many as 372 people 
searching adult terms online.”98  That number is likely even 
higher today.99  Annual pornography revenue is estimated at over 
$13 billion.100  As pornography expands, so does its reach to 
consumers and the potential for litigation.  Obscenity law under 
Miller is a broken system, one described as “unpopular with the 
three most interested parties: anti-pornography advocates, 
federal prosecutors, and pornographers.”101 
Internet pornographers have little to no control over where 
their material ends up.102  The Internet is made of intangible 
data.  It is impossible for a user on one end to anticipate where 
his data will be accessed.103  Applying a local standard to test 
 
95 See sources cited supra note 10. 
96 See Shannon Creasy, Note, Defending Against a Charge of Obscenity in the 
Internet Age: How Google Searches Can Illuminate Miller’s “Contemporary 
Community Standards”, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1029, 1031 (2010) (observing that 
“[t]echnological advances that allow pornographers to efficiently stream online video 
and view pictures have led to an explosion in the pornography market”). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
99 See, e.g., Matt Richtel, What’s Obscene? Defendant Says Google Data Offers a 
Gauge, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2008, at A1. 
100 See Creasy, supra note 96; Fritz, supra note 10 (describing Adult Video News 
as worth $13 billion). But see Ackman, supra note 9 (noting that double digit billion 
dollar estimations of the pornography revenue may be overinflated, suggesting that 
a more approximate figure is in the low billions). 
101 Michael J. Gray, Applying Nuisance Law to Internet Obscenity, 6 ISJLP 317, 
323 (2010). 
102 See Creasy, supra note 96, at 1042 (“[S]ellers operating on the Internet often 
have limited control over where their products end up. Items posted on the Internet 
are immediately available for viewing and downloading by users around the world.”). 
103 See id. (“[T]he Internet defies geographic boundaries, and it is still not 
possible for website operators to reliably and effectively limit access based on 
geographical location[s] . . . .”). 
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whether something is “obscene” results in “individuals being 
prosecuted by the standard of the most restrictive community 
with access to the Internet.”104  Pornography that has yet to be 
deemed “obscene” is legal,105 but may be offensive to some 
potential user.  Moreover, the Internet poses particular problems 
to Miller.   
B. Forum Shopping 
Of the most identifiable problems with Miller and the 
Internet is prosecutorial forum shopping.106  The structure of the 
Internet, in conjunction with the Miller test, encourages forum 
shopping.  Based on federal application of Miller, as seen through 
cases such as United States v. Thomas,107 all one has to do to 
obtain jurisdiction over pornographers is access their websites.  
Prosecutors may bring suit anywhere materials are distributed.  
Because of the way the Internet operates, anywhere with 
Internet access is therefore a proper jurisdiction for suit.108  
The facts of cases like Thomas and Little illuminate the 
problems of forum shopping.  In Thomas, Californian 
pornographers were prosecuted in Tennessee, although they 
never took any action to place their materials in Tennessee.109  A 
postal inspector “logged into defendant’s bulletin board system in 
 
104 Id. (quoting John Tehranian, Sanitizing Cyberspace: Obscenity, Miller, and 
the Future of Public Discourse on the Internet, 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 18 (2003)). 
105 As long as it complies with relevant state and federal law. 
106 Which can also be highly political. See Paul M. Barrett, Multiple Jeopardy? 
Porn Defendants Face Indictments in Courts Far from their Bases, WALL ST. J., July 
27, 1990, at A1; Jim McGee, U.S. Crusade Against Pornography Tests the Limits of 
Fairness, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 1993, at A1 (noting that the government’s “principal 
tactic against distributors of sexually explicit films . . . [is] the use of simultaneous 
or successive indictments in conservative jurisdictions around the country” with the 
intention of strong-arming distributors into cessation through the burden of pending 
litigation on multiple fronts); Bret Boyce, Obscenity and Community Standards, 33 
YALE J. INT’L L. 299, 324–25 (2008) (observing that, “In the United States today, 
federal obscenity prosecutions are sporadic, but arbitrary and highly politicized”); 
Barton Gellman, Recruits Sought for Porn Squad, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2005, at 
A21 (noting that Alberto Gonzales, Bush’s Attorney General, declared making 
obscenity prosecutions a top priority). 
107 74 F.3d 701, 711 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that obscenity may be prosecuted in 
any jurisdiction through which the allegedly obscene material passes). 
108 See Erik G. Swenson, Comment, Redefining Community Standards in Light 
of the Geographic Limitlessness of the Internet: A Critique of United States v. 
Thomas, 82 MINN. L. REV. 855, 880 (1998). 
109 See id. at 875. This is analogous to the situation seen in Little. See infra notes 
125–29 and accompanying text. 
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California, scanned the information, and then selectively 
downloaded pictures into Tennessee.  Significantly, it was the 
federal agent who purposely availed himself of the Tennessee 
community, not the defendant.”110  This was not an arbitrary 
decision, but one calculated to obtain conviction.111 
This is but one example of what is a common practice: 
“prosecutors . . . bringing charges only in conservative 
communities, where they have a greater chance of empanelling a 
jury that will judge sexually oriented materials obscene.”112  
Professor Clay Calvert details the problem in his analysis of 
“Project PostPorn,” a government operation to prosecute adult 
movie producers in the late 1980s and early 1990s.113  Under the 
auspices of “Project PostPorn,” Federal agents actively 
prosecuted Californian pornography producers in Bible Belt 
areas “in the belief that it [would] be easier to obtain convictions 
in conservative, rural America than in anything-goes Los 
Angeles.”114  According to a commentator, Project PostPorn was 
“aimed at ruining the business of mail-order operations selling 
sexually explicit—but not obscene—merchandise.”115  Moreover, 
the federal government acknowledges the use of forum shopping 
under “Project PostPorn.”116 
 
110 Swenson, supra note 108, at 875. 
111 See United States v. Blucher, 581 F.2d 244, 245–46 (10th Cir. 1978) 
(discussing the problem of forum shopping for conservative communities where the 
defendants’ home domicile is more liberal), vacated, 439 U.S. 1061 (1979). 
112 Robert F. Howe, U.S. Accused of ‘Censorship by Intimidation’ in Pornography 
Cases, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 1990, at A4. 
113 See Clay Calvert, The End of Forum Shopping in Internet Obscenity Cases? 
The Ramifications of the Ninth Circuit’s Groundbreaking Understanding of 
Community Standards in Cyberspace, 89 NEB. L. REV. 47, 56–57 (2010). 
114 See id. at 57 (quoting John Johnson, Into the Valley of Sleaze: Demand is 
Strong, but Police Crackdowns and a Saturated Market Spell Trouble for One of 
L.A.’s Biggest Businesses, L.A. TIMES MAG., Feb. 17, 1991, at 8, 10). 
115 Calvert, supra note 113, at 57–58 (quoting Margaret A. Blanchard, The 
American Urge To Censor: Freedom of Expression Versus the Desire to Sanitize 
Society—From Anthony Comstock to 2 Live Crew, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 741, 821 
(1992)). 
116 See Calvert, supra note 113, at 64–65 (quoting Laurie P. Cohen, Internet’s 
Ubiquity Multiplies Venues To Try Web Crimes, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2007, at B1) 
(“In fact, former United States Attorney Mary Beth Buchanan, who prosecuted 
[obscenity cases], has openly acknowledged that ‘the case could have been brought in 
any district in which the product was sold,’ but [was brought in a district that] ‘may 
be considered by some to be more conservative.’ ”).  
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Courts, too, have acknowledged the problem of forum 
shopping in obscenity cases.117  In one case, the court wrote that 
obscenity prosecutions “present[] an unusual, perhaps unique 
confluence of factors: substantial evidence of an extensive 
government campaign . . . designed to use the burden of repeated 
criminal prosecutions to chill the exercise of First Amendment 
rights.”118  Under this scheme, defendants’ fate relies on 
prosecutorial discretion.  Moreover, even in the event of a 
favorable outcome, litigation is costly.  In the case quoted above, 
where the judge admonished prosecutorial forum shopping, the 
“winner” ultimately spent $3 million in legal fees battling the 
government.119 
In a more recent example, United States v. Extreme 
Associates, Inc.,120 Californian pornographers were prosecuted for 
obscenity in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.121  They were charged 
with “mailing three video tapes to an undercover United States 
postal inspector in Pittsburgh and delivering six digital video 
clips over the Internet to that same . . . inspector.”122  This 
inspector had ordered the tapes through Extreme Associates’ 
website and accessed the clips after purchasing a monthly 
membership—the inspector was the one who availed himself of 
the jurisdiction and material.123  According to Calvert, “Given 
that southern California is the home of the adult movie industry 
in the United States[,] . . . it is not surprising that blue-collar-
stereotyped Pittsburgh would be perceived as a more 
conservative and, in turn, more favorable venue . . . .”124  In 
Extreme Associates, the only reason that the defendants found 
 
117 See, e.g., United States v. P.H.E., Inc., 965 F.2d 848, 860 (10th Cir. 1992) 
(holding that “vindictive prosecution” is a legitimate grounds to overturn an 
obscenity conviction.). 
118 Id. at 855. 
119 Calvert, supra note 113, at 60–61; see also McGee, supra note 106 (noting 
that prosecutors use the tactic of forum shopping in hopes that “distributors would 
simply give up and agree to whatever terms of future conduct the prosecutors 
dictated, when faced with the expense and logistics of defending against a number of 
federal charges in different places, all at the same time”). 
120 431 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2005). 
121 Id. at 151–52. See Calvert, supra note 113, at 64. 
122 United States v. Extreme Assocs., Inc., No. 03-0203, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
2860, at *1–2 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 15, 2009).  
123 Id. at *2. 
124 Calvert, supra note 113, at 64–65; see also Joe Mozingo, Obscenity Task 
Force’s Aim Disputed, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2007, at B1 (“Prosecutors . . . frequently 
have picked Christian conservative areas to file.”). 
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themselves in Pittsburgh for trial was because the prosecutors 
effected a sting-type operation, and brought them there because 
of the conservative jury.  Defendants had done nothing to solicit 
their materials to the good people of Pittsburgh, nor could they 
have had any expectation that they would be hailed to court 
there. 
In the Little case, Paul Little, again, a Californian 
pornography producer,125 was tried in Tampa, Florida.126  Like 
Extreme, the prosecutors accessed the “obscene” material 
themselves and ordered it to a mailbox in their preferred 
venue.127  One commentator observed that “[t]he Bush 
administration could have chosen any state in the Union, but 
engineered an indictment in Tampa—an open case of forum 
shopping for the most conservative jury pool it could find.”128  
Practices such as these cannot be dismissed as simple 
gamesmanship in the adversarial process; they are unfair 
because the defendant has no viable method of protecting his 
speech from being accessed in conservative communities.   
 
 
125 If this seems like déjà vu, it is because it is a notable trend. The majority of 
pornography originates in California, specifically the San Fernando Valley. This 
area has been referred to as “Porn Valley.” See Brad A. Greenberg, Frisky Kitty 
Battle Lands in Judge’s Lap, L.A. DAILY NEWS, July 17, 2006, at N1 (observing that 
the “San Fernando Valley [is] known to some as Porn Valley since it is home to most 
of the nation’s pornography industry”); Sharon Mitchell, How To Put Condoms in the 
Picture, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2004, at Section 4, 11 (“[T]he San Fernando Valley—or 
‘Porn Valley’—[is] where much of the sex-film industry is based . . . .”); see also Fritz, 
supra note 10 (describing the effect that both the 2008 economic recession and the 
growth of online websites have had on the California pornography industry). 
126 See Calvert, supra note 113, at 65. 
127 Compare Extreme Assocs., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2860, at *1–2 
(“[D]efendants have been charged with mailing three video tapes to an undercover 
United States postal inspector in Pittsburgh and delivering six digital video clips 
over the Internet to that same undercover postal inspector. The inspector ordered 
the video tapes through Extreme Associates’ publicly available website and accessed 
the video clips after purchasing a monthly membership to the members only section 
of Extreme Associates’ website.”), with United States v. Little, 365 F. App’x 159, 161 
(11th Cir. 2010) (“As part of the investigation, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service 
office in Tampa ordered five DVD videos from the Appellants’ websites. The 
inspector entered a post office box in Tampa as her shipping address and the DVDs 
were subsequently shipped via U.S. mail.”). 
128 James Madison Meets Max Hardcore: Florida Obscenity Case Could Force 
Review of Community Standards in Internet Age, JONATHANTURLEY.ORG (June 2, 
2008), http://jonathanturley.org/2008/06/02/little-indiscretion-florida-obsenity-case-
could-force-review-of-community-standards-in-internet-age/. 
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Because the micro-local standard applies,129 the defendants 
cannot anticipate the ultimate judge of their speech even though 
it may be acceptable and legal in their home venue. 
Forum shopping is encouraged under Miller because it loads 
the deck.  Prosecutors have an incentive to vigilantly bring 
obscenity prosecutions because they can select forums that are 
more likely to convict.  This mechanic incentivizes the 
persistence of discretionary prosecution, but there is no real 
“controversy.”  In most cases, no citizens in the jurisdiction 
complained; rather, they are used as a tool for prosecutors.  
C. Subjectivity/Vagueness 
Another problem with Miller, one that has followed the test 
since inception, is subjectivity: how to define and apply the test.  
As one pornographer described, “This is the only crime you don’t 
know you did until the jury tells you you did it.”130  Jurors are 
instructed not to apply their own standards, but “the standards 
of the ‘average person’ in their community.”131  The Court has 
noted that “a principal concern . . . is to assure that the material 
is judged neither on the basis of each juror’s personal opinion, 
nor by its effect on a particularly sensitive or insensitive person 
or group.”132  Of course, this is easier said than done.  As ACLU 
President Nadine Strossen queried: “Can you honestly imagine 
doing anything other than invoking your own tastes and 
preferences?”133  Juries, it is said, “apply their interpretations of 
local standards case-by-case in highly fact-specific rulings.”134  
Miller doctrine is therefore inherently subjective; it is very 
unlikely that a typical juror will do anything other than rely on 
his own personal tastes and opinions. 
 
 
 
 
129 See infra Part II.C. 
130 Mozingo, supra note 124. 
131 Cenite, supra note 53, at 35. 
132 Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 107 (1974). 
133 Cenite, supra note 53, at 36 (quoting NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING 
PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE FIGHT FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS 53 (1995)). 
134 Cenite, supra note 53, at 51. 
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Vagueness is a recognized problem in law to the point that 
courts may void laws for vagueness.135  In the Miller dissent, 
Justice Douglas wrote that “no more vivid illustration of vague 
and uncertain laws could be designed than those we have 
fashioned.”136  Echoing many of the concerns of those in the 
pornography industry, Douglas maintained that due process 
would only be served if one were prosecuted for material that had 
already been deemed obscene.137  The problems of vagueness are 
compounded and enhanced by the Internet.  Problems arise in 
the context of “the vast number of communities whose standards 
may be applied and the rapidity with which new content is 
published, resulting in a staggering burden on content 
providers.”138 
The problem of vagueness is closely linked to the local 
community standard.  Dawn Nunziato, a George Wasington 
University Professor, writes, “Miller affirmatively establishes 
that local communities enjoy the prerogative to determine what 
sexually-themed expression is to be deemed obscene within their 
communities.”139  A large part of this comes from the historical 
place of pornography and its tension with the law, a deeper 
foundational basis for Miller itself: 
[T]he theory behind Miller is that since local communities are 
the ones that have to deal with the allegedly deleterious effects 
of the public display and sale of sexually explicit materials . . . it 
should be the local communities . . . that decide whether a 
particular movie, book or magazine is in fact obscene.140 
But this reasoning does not make sense in the context of the 
Internet.  Most material must be affirmatively accessed, and in 
no means is on “public display.”  Indeed, there are indications 
that the policy behind the obscenity exception may be outdated. 
 
135 See Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (holding that “a 
statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that 
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to 
its application violates the first essential of due process of law”). 
136 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 41 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
137 Id. at 42. 
138 Cenite, supra note 53, at 51–52. 
139 Dawn C. Nunziato, Technology and Pornography, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1535, 
1540. 
140 Calvert, supra note 113, at 61–62 (quoting FREDERICK S. LANE III, OBSCENE 
PROFITS: THE ENTREPRENEURS OF PORNOGRAPHY IN THE CYBER AGE xx, (2001)). 
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Currently, there is no obligation for either side to enter 
evidence of a relevant community standard.141  It is presumed 
that juries will know the prevailing standard and that the 
material “speak[s] for itself.”142  In Miller, a police officer who had 
conducted a statewide survey testified as to community 
standards.143  Indeed, many have argued for the use of surveys as 
objective evidence of community standards.144   
D. Chilling Speech 
A defendant’s inability to ascertain what is actually 
“obscene” in a given community, the vagueness of obscenity 
doctrine, and the very real threat of criminal prosecution lead 
directly to a chilling of free speech.145  Moreover, because 
obscenity only exists after it has been deemed so, a pornographer 
wishing to distribute materials must take his chances at 
prosecution.  Prior to Miller, Justice Brennan argued against a 
local approach because of its chilling effect, asserting that “[i]t 
would be a hardy person who would sell a book or exhibit a film 
anywhere in the land after this Court ha[s] sustained the 
judgment of one ‘community.’ ”146  Justice Harlan wrote that local 
standards may have “the intolerable consequence of denying  
 
 
 
141 Scot A. Duvall, A Call for Obscenity Law Reform, 1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
75, 92–95 (discussing the need to introduce objective evidence in obscenity trials); 
Creasy, supra note 96, at 1044 (observing that in obscenity prosecutions, “the State 
is not obligated to provide proof of the community standards” and that “[j]uries are 
presumed to already know the prevailing community standards”); Rebecca Dawn 
Kaplan, Note, Cyber-Smut: Regulating Obscenity on the Internet, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 189, 192–93 (1998) (arguing for the need for surveys in obscenity trials, and 
describing how one could be implemented). But see Creasy, supra note 96, at 1054 
(“[T]he State should be required to present evidence to prove the community 
standards.”). 
142 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 n.6 (1973) (quoting United 
States v. Wild, 422 F.2d 34, 36 (1969)). 
143 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 31 n.12 (1973). 
144 See, e.g., Creasy, supra note 96, at 1047–48 (observing that “proponents of 
prosecutorial use of survey evidence have advised that a carefully crafted and 
conducted survey could be used for years across multiple trials, offering some 
protection in cases where courts require the State to provide evidence of the 
standard”); Kaplan, supra note 141. 
145 See Creasy, supra note 96, at 1052 (noting that “[a]n inability to define the 
community is unacceptable because it prevents the defendant from effectively 
exercising the right to present evidence to prove the community standard”). 
146 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 194 (1964). 
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some sections of the country access to material, there deemed 
acceptable, which in others might be considered offensive to 
prevailing community standards of decency.”147  
An identifiable problem with Miller is what Professor Mark 
Cenite calls a “lack of specificity about the geographic 
community’s scope . . . because content providers cannot tell in 
advance who is included in a community with which they wish to 
communicate.”148  Cenite compares the issue to the one before the 
Court in Hamling, involving mail.  The Court in Hamling held 
prosecutions could be permitted in any district the obscene 
material passed through.149  Justice Brennan, in dissent, wrote: 
Under today’s “local” standards construction, . . . the guilt or 
innocence of distributors of identical materials mailed from the 
same locale can now turn on the chancy course of transit or 
place of delivery of the materials. National distributors choosing 
to send their products in interstate travels will be forced to cope 
with the community standards of every hamlet into which their 
goods may wander.150   
This principle “create[s] even heavier burdens on the 
Internet, a ‘packet’ network where parts of the same message 
may take different, unpredictable routes through computers all 
over the world before being reassembled at their destinations.”151  
The net effect of imposing the standards of the most restrictive 
community on all communities is that it deprives the medium of 
diversity of expression and deprives adults of the right to access 
materials that would not violate their own personal standards, or 
the standards of their communities.152 
It has even been argued that we are currently operating 
under a de facto national standard, the national standard of the 
most restrictive community.153  The most conservative 
 
147 Manual Enters. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962). 
148 Cenite, supra note 53, at 35. 
149 Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 143–144 (1974) (holding that 
jurisdiction could be obtained wherever mail was received); see also United States v. 
Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 711 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that obscenity may be prosecuted 
in any jurisdiction through which the allegedly obscene material passes). 
150 Hamling, 418 U.S. at 144 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
151 Cenite, supra note 53, at 39. 
152 Id. at 56. 
153 Swenson, supra note 108, at 878 (“A local community standard leads to the 
lowest-common-denominator approach, whereby distributors market only material 
that conforms to the standards of the most sensitive community. This standard 
creates a de facto national standard that chills freedom of speech.”). 
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communities in the country are thereby forcing their values on 
the users of the Internet.154  Cenite observes, “A national average 
standard has the virtue of preventing the least tolerant 
community from controlling the entire medium, and giving the 
least tolerant community the same influence on the national 
average as the most tolerant community.”155  These concerns 
were recently raised in the news when residents of 
Massachusetts filed an injunction to prevent a new expansive 
obscenity law from being passed, citing fear that it would chill 
free speech.156 
III. PROBLEMS WITH A NATIONAL STANDARD 
Because of all the problems associated with Miller, the Ninth 
Circuit’s approach in Kilbride is refreshing.  The national 
standard, unfortunately, does not solve everything.  Many have 
argued that given the size and diversity of the United States, a 
national standard is unascertainable.157  Improperly applied, a 
national standard could be just as unworkable as the Miller test.  
Alternatively, a national standard may bring “new definitional 
and constitutional questions.”158  Any uniform, or national, 
standard would have to operate through objective guidelines to 
alleviate definitional problems and avoid repeating the 
vagueness of Miller.159 
 
 
154 Id. at 878–79 (observing that the current, or lowest-common-denominator 
approach, “allows non-Internet users in the most conservative jurisdiction of the 
country to force their values not only upon the rest of the country, but also upon the 
world-wide community of Internet users.”). 
155 Cenite, supra note 53, at 70. 
156 Denise Lavoie, Groups Challenge Obscenity Law Scope, BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 20, 
2010, at Metro 2. 
157 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33 (1973) (“People in different States vary in 
their tastes and attitudes, and this diversity is not to be strangled by the absolutism 
of imposed uniformity.”); Boyce, supra note 106, at 345 (noting that a national 
community of values toward obscenity “scarcely exists”). 
158 Cenite, supra note 53, at 26, 57. 
159 See Randolph Stuart Sergent, The “Hamlet” Fallacy: Computer Networks and 
the Geographic Roots of Obscenity Regulation, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 671, 716 
(1996) (positing that the replacement of “national” for “local” in a Miller analysis 
would not reduce the problems of Miller, including the chilling effect on speech, 
because “those speaking on national or international computer networks will still be 
unable to predict how every jury in every community will view the ‘national’ decency 
standard”). 
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States’ rights and concerns of federalism present problems.  
The Miller test and traditional approaches are “rationales with 
deep roots in the principles of federalism.”160  These concerns 
have been present since Miller came down.  Federalism concerns 
also were present in Miller, where “[t]he Court 
warned . . . against resolving conflicts between states by 
arbitrarily depriving the States of . . . power.”161  A national 
standard has also been described as, “strangling diversity of 
tastes and attitudes . . . . The median obscenity standard it would 
call for juries to create would wind up restricting speech deemed 
acceptable by many communities, while forcing other 
communities to accept speech that they deem highly 
objectionable.”162  The net result could be a homogenization of 
diverse national culture and attitude.  Perhaps more tellingly, 
citizens of conservative communities would be offended at the 
thought of a national cultural mandate forcing them to accept the 
cultural norms of more liberal communities like New York and 
Las Vegas.163  These concerns are all the more present in modern 
times, where political matters are contentiously schismatic, and 
strong support exists in popular opinion for States’ rights. 
Any kind of solution must be concrete and objective.  Most 
objections to a national standard are aimed at the potential 
ambiguity of such a standard.164  Moreover, it is possible that the 
delineation of a “national” standard would be in effect the same 
as a local standard, because a juror cannot apply the standard of 
an unknown realm.165  Even if a “national” standard were 
mandated, a juror would likely still apply his own beliefs.   
 
160 Cenite, supra note 53, at 32. 
161 Id. at 58 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
162 Calvert, supra note 113, at 84 (quoting David Johnson, U.S. v. Kilbride: 9th 
Circuit’s Holding that Internet Obscenity Laws Should be Governed by a National 
Standard Rests on Shaky Grounds, DIGITAL MEDIA LAWYER BLOG (Nov. 5, 2009), 
http://www.digitalmedialawyerblog.com/2009/11/us_v_kilbride_9th_circuits_hol.html 
(website no longer available)). 
163 Apparently a modern equivalent of Sodom and Gomorrah. See Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15, 32 (1973). 
164 See, e.g., Developments in the Law—The Law of Cyberspace, 112 HARV. L. 
REV. 1574, 1598 (1999) (warning of the “broadest definition of obscenity, potentially 
resulting in an alarming retreat to a national obscenity standard”); see also Cenite, 
supra note 53, at 70 (“If obscenity regulation is to continue in new media, the 
standard involved must be defined.”). 
165 Calvert, supra note 113, at 77 (“[H]ow can a hypothetical juror from 
Louisville, Kentucky who has spent her entire life there, be expected to take into 
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Extrinsic evidence has been proffered as a solution, 
introducing objective forms of evidence to show the popularity of 
pornography, correlating this to acceptability.  Many 
commentators have debated the issue, arguing that defendants 
should introduce evidence to establish standards, or force the 
prosecution to introduce objective evidence.166  Internet searches 
have been analyzed as a possible form of objective evidence.  In 
one case, a Florida man indicted on federal obscenity charges 
offered to use Google search engine data of his community to 
show that his material was not obscene.167  The case settled out of 
court, but prompted at least one commentator to propose using 
Google data as relevant evidence.168  This poses problems though 
because “if the national community standard for the Internet is 
to be judged by what is accepted on the Internet, then . . . a great 
deal of sexual content is widely accepted . . . .”169  The results of 
such a method would be dubious at best, evidenced by the simple 
example that if search “hits” alone are a measure of acceptability, 
then “orgy” trumps “apple pie” by a country mile.170 
IV. PROPOSED ANSWER 
The national standard delineated by the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals is a good start.  It effectively addresses the concerns of 
chilling of speech and forum shopping.  Unfortunately though, it 
may be just as vague, if not more confusing, than the Miller test.  
Any forward-looking approach must take into account concerns of 
federalism, and limit subjectivity in definition and application.  
This section proposes a method whereby this is achieved.  Part 
IV.A analyzes the problem of Miller at the most fundamental 
level—the text of the case itself—and argues that the language of 
the decision is flawed.  Part IV.B introduces the “evolving 
 
account the sexual values and mores of places like Austin, Texas; San Francisco, 
California; or anywhere else, for that matter?”). 
166 See Creasy, supra note 96, at 1054; Kaplan, supra note 141 (arguing for the 
need for surveys in obscenity trials, and describing how one could be implemented).  
167 See Creasy, supra note 96, at 1033–34; Monica Hesse, The Google Ogle 
Defense: A Search For America’s Psyche, WASH. POST, July 3, 2008, at C1; Richtel, 
supra note 99. 
168 See Creasy, supra note 96, at 1054 (arguing that “the courts should allow 
either party to use new search engine tracking technology to illuminate the 
standards of the community.”). 
169 Calvert, supra note 113, at 78. 
170 See Richtel, supra note 99 (describing the relationship between search results 
for “apple pie” and “orgy”). 
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standards of decency” test and demonstrates that this test is 
actually a close relative of the Miller test.  Part IV.C proposes 
methods for determining what he “evolving standards of decency” 
would be, mostly relying on the use of survey evidence.  Part 
IV.D introduces an international comparative framework, first 
showing that the Supreme Court often relies on international law 
in determining “evolving standards of decency,” and then 
weighing the arguments against such an approach.  Part IV.E in 
turn rejects the arguments against an international analysis, 
providing reliable objective guidelines for determining how to 
apply international law to national jurisprudence.  
A. Community Standards is Flawed Language and Should Be 
Replaced with Evolving Standards of Decency 
The text of Miller presents problems.  Critics, jurists, and 
jurors alike have struggled with the meaning of “whether the 
average person, applying contemporary community standards, 
would find that the work, as a whole, appeals to the prurient 
interest.”171  Ignoring the issue of defining “prurient interest,” the 
“contemporary community standards” language is vague on its 
face.  Superimposing a “national community standards” test does 
little to alleviate this problem.  For this reason, the Eighth 
Amendment’s “evolving standards of decency” test suits the 
purpose better: it already presupposes a national inquiry, and it 
demands objective inquiry.  It may be worth noting, too, that it 
has already been used in analyzing sexual privacy.172  Perhaps 
most importantly, it allows for international comparative 
analysis, something which is fundamentally suited for the 
Internet, because the Internet is a global medium. 
The use of “evolving standards of decency” is not a major 
departure from current jurisprudence and the Miller test.  In an 
essay on the conventional morality theory of judicial review, 
Wojciech Sadurski looks to the various judicial tests used to 
quantify a “moral majority.”  Morality is considered and defined 
according to Sadurski by, “contemporary community standards,  
 
 
171 See supra Part II. 
172 See Corinna Barrett Lain, The Unexceptionalism of “Evolving Standards,” 57 
UCLA L. REV. 365, 372–73 (2009) (noting the similarity between the “evolving 
standards of decency” test and its methodology, and the court’s analysis in Lawrence 
v. Texas). 
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community values, public morality . . . [and] evolving standards 
of decency.”173  Sadurski notes that these standards are applied to 
obscenity.174  In essence, these tests all serve the same purpose. 
The tests both seek to ascertain the same goal: a majority 
view on a moral issue.  Moreover, the Supreme Court has been 
known to use similar phrases interchangeably.175  The purpose is 
the same, to “gaug[e] public temperament.”176  Under the 
“evolving standards” doctrine, courts look to see whether a 
national consensus has developed against a punishment, using a 
majoritarian approach.177  Roger Alford notes that “the very 
notion that ‘community standards’ should have constitutional 
import is a concession to majoritarianism.”178 
The “evolving standards of decency” language is not a 
panacea of course, and begs the question: whose evolving 
standards of decency?  Indeed, the test has some aspects of 
ambiguity.179  Part of the vagueness in these doctrines is 
necessary for allowing flexibility.180  “Evolving standards” is 
useful because it calls for objective guidance.  Specifically, the 
methodology of the Court in Atkins v. Virginia181 serves as a 
helpful guidepost.  In Atkins, the Court used “evolving standards 
of decency” to determine whether to forbid the executions of 
mentally retarded criminals.182  The Court used the test to 
analyze legislation as an objective indication of these “evolving 
standards,” searching for a national consensus.183  Because a  
 
 
173 WOJCIECH SADURSKI, MORAL PLURALISM AND LEGAL NEUTRALITY 38 (1990) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
174 Id. at 39. 
175 Id. at 38–39; Paige Connor Worsham, Note, So Easily Offended? A First 
Amendment Analysis of the FCC’s Evolving Regulation of Broadcast Indecency and 
Standards For Our Contemporary Community, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 378, 404 
(2008). 
176 See Worsham, supra note 175. 
177 Lain, supra note 172, at 366 (“[P]rohibiting a punishment only after a 
majority of states have already done so on their own.”). 
178 Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, 52 
UCLA L. REV. 639, 685 (2005); Boyce, supra note 106, at 338 (implying that a reason 
for obscenity law in general is majoritarianism, contrasted with a Canadian 
rejection of this idea). 
179 See Worsham, supra note 175. 
180 Id. 
181 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
182 Worsham, supra note 175. 
183 Id. 
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national consensus is needed in obscenity law to combat the 
problems of Miller and the Internet, the application of “evolving 
standards of decency” is apt. 
B. Determining the “Evolving Standards” 
The use of evolving standards is admittedly a majoritarian 
doctrine.  The fears of federalism advocates may be allayed in 
considering the history of Supreme Court jurisprudence, which 
reveals that “the Court routinely—and explicitly—determines 
constitutional protection based on whether a majority of states 
agree with it.”184  Some have argued that First Amendment 
jurisprudence is no different, and is “chock full of line drawing 
and limitations, with examples of explicitly majoritarian 
decisionmaking [sic] at nearly every turn.”185  Moreover, it has 
been said that the “contemporary community” standards test is 
nothing if not a “nose-counting” of the majority.186  At a threshold 
level, the decision to exclude categories of speech from First 
Amendment protection turned upon majoritarian analysis.187  
From there, the exclusion of child pornography followed a similar 
methodology, taking into account state statutes.188 
Assuming that a majoritarian consensus is relevant in 
ascertaining “community standards,” or “evolving standards of 
decency,” the use of surveys can provide highly probative 
evidence of a national consensus.189  A particularly useful piece 
would be the recently released survey, The National Survey of 
Sexual Health and Behavior (“NSSHB”).  The NSSHB, a recently 
released survey by researchers at Indiana University, is the 
largest survey of sexual behaviors and attitudes in 20 years.190  It 
 
184 Lain, supra note 172, at 365, 369 (opining that “[o]ver the past few years, the 
country’s top constitutional scholars have filled volumes of law reviews convincing 
us that the Supreme Court is an inherently majoritarian institution, and it is” 
(footenotes omitted)). 
185 Id. at 392. 
186 See Ernest A. Young, Comment, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 148, 158–59 (2005). 
187 Lain, supra note 172, at 393. 
188 Id. at 394. 
189 See Calvert, supra note 113, at 61–62; Creasy, supra note 96, at 1052; supra 
note 141. 
190 See Carolyn Butler, After 20 Years, the Sexual Landscape has Shifted, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 16, 2010, at E2; Ctr. Sexual Health Promotion, NATIONAL SURVEY OF 
SEXUAL HEALTH AND BEHAVIOR, http://www.nationalsexstudy.indiana.edu/ (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2012). 
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surveys a large sample size and quantifies types of sexual 
activity and attitudes.191  The NSSHB could be an excellent 
resource for starting an analysis of whether something is 
nationally acceptable.  Although some surveys have been 
criticized due to their small sample size, the NSSHB is immune 
to such attacks because of its breadth and comprehensiveness, 
and is therefore a sound guide.192 
Many of the common targets of obscenity convictions are 
demonstrably acceptable by the NSSHB.  In Paris Adult Theatre 
I v. Slaton,193 the Supreme Court acknowledged that some thirty-
one obscenity cases were determined by the Justices applying 
their own separate criteria of obscenity.194  These criteria were 
anything but scientific; for example, Justice White deemed 
anything showing erections, intercourse, oral or anal sex, 
obscene.195  Florida, a state often sought for obscenity 
prosecutions, has an obscenity statute decreeing anal and oral 
sex as “deviate sexual intercourse.”196  The NSSHB lifts the veil 
of Americans’ private lives, however, showing that 88% of men 
aged 30–39 engaged in fellatio and that nearly half of 25–29 year 
olds have engaged in anal sex at least once.197  With such large 
numbers, it is hard to make an argument that these activities are 
unacceptable by nature. 
C. International Comparative Analysis Framework 
The Internet, though, is not strictly confined to our national 
borders.  For this reason, an international comparative analysis 
would be helpful and illustrative.  Obscenity law is inseparable 
from international law, as the doctrine grew out of international 
analysis.198  Informed not only by the history of American 
obscenity law, an international approach is valuable for shedding 
 
191 See Butler, supra note 190. 
192 See, e.g., Creasy, supra note 96, at 1049 (describing various instances where 
courts have rejected survey data). 
193 413 U.S. 49 (1973). 
194 Id. at 82 n.8 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
195 BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 232 (1979). 
196 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.001(5) (West 2008). This definition is still subject to 
the “contemporary community standards” test, but seems extremely suggestive. See 
Haggerty v. State, 531 So. 2d 364, 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). 
197 See Jon Henley, America Reveals its Sexual Secrets, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 5, 
2010, 4:00 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2010/oct/05/sex-us-american-
attitudes-survey?INTCMP=SRCH. 
198 See infra Part IV.D. 
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light on obscenity doctrine because American jurisprudence is so 
fractured.199  Moreover, international analysis has been used 
under “evolving standards” more frequently as of late, and can be 
narrowed objectively by guiding measures. 
As a preliminary point, it should be noted that obscenity 
doctrine was instituted from international comparative inquiry.  
When the Court excluded obscenity from First Amendment 
protection it cited “the universal judgment that obscenity should 
be restrained, reflected in the international agreement of over 50 
nations, in the obscenity laws of all of the 48 States, and in the 
20 obscenity laws enacted by the Congress from 1842 to 1956.”200  
This is an explicitly majoritarian exception: “[the Court] made a 
categorical ruling based on the one the states had made on their 
own.”201  Therefore, disregarding the recent resurgence of 
international comparative analysis in constitutional law, 
obscenity doctrine itself is innately an international inquiry.  
Moreover, this applies with greater force to the Internet because 
the Internet is an international medium. 
International inquiry has been used increasingly in 
constitutional analysis, particularly in determining “evolving 
standards of decency.”202  In Atkins v. Virginia,203 Justice Stevens 
cited the “world community” in support of what he determined 
was an emerging “widespread consensus” against the death 
penalty for the mentally infirm.204  This reasoning has expanded 
beyond the realm of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, along 
with the “evolving standards” test.  In Lawrence v. Texas, Justice 
Kennedy cited a decision of the European Court of Human Rights 
to invalidate Texas sodomy laws.205  Far from anomalies, the 
Court has a long tradition of using foreign law to inform 
constitutional analysis.206  Foreign law has even  “informed the 
test of “reasonableness,” a standard eminently similar to the 
 
199 See United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1252 (9th Cir. 2009); Boyce, 
supra note 106, at 345 (comparing American obscenity law with Canadian law, and 
noting that American law is vague and uncertain in comparison). 
200 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (footnotes omitted). 
201 Lain, supra note 172, at 394. 
202 See O’Brien, supra note 26, at 105. 
203 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
204 Id. at 316 n.21, 317. 
205 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003). 
206 See O’Brien, supra note 26, at 89. 
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Miller issue.207  This correlation is seen in cases such as Coker v. 
Georgia,208 Atkins v. Virginia,209 Lawrence v. Texas,210 and Roper 
v. Simmons.211 
The use of comparative analysis is polarizing.212  Justice 
Ginsburg has endorsed the view, going so far as to warn, “[w]e 
are the losers if we do not both share our experience with, and 
learn from others.”213  Not all share this view; the international 
approach has been criticized by many, on and off the bench.214  A 
major concern comes from subjective judicial interpretation; fears 
arise that subjective application of foreign law can result in 
countermajoritarian rule.215  Nonetheless, there are compelling 
reasons for international analysis in the context of Internet 
pornography, mostly tied to the problems of the local standard in 
the digital age.216  Unlike the issue of whether a right embedded 
in domestic law should apply to domestic conduct in light of a 
similar foreign law, here the issue is more compelling.  Like  
 
 
 
207 See id. at 92–93. 
208 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977) (“It is . . . not irrelevant here that out of 60 
major nations in the world surveyed in 1965, only 3 retained the death penalty for 
rape where death did not ensue.”). 
209 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (basing decision to ban executions of mentally 
retarded criminals partly on consensus of “world community”). 
210 539 U.S. 558, 576–78 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 
(1986)) (relying on decisions of European jurisdictions for evidence of consensus). 
211 543 U.S. 551, 577–78 (2005) (relying partly on international authorities in 
holding a juvenile death penalty unconstitutional). 
212 Justice Scalia provided a vehement dissent in Atkins. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 
347 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing that “the Prize for the Court’s Most Feeble 
Effort to fabricate ‘national consensus’ must go to its appeal . . . to the views 
of . . . the so called ‘world community[]’ ”); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (“Constitutional entitlements do not spring into existence because . . . 
foreign nations decriminalize conduct.”). 
213 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a 
Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 1 
(2003). 
214 See, e.g., supra note 212; infra note 215. 
215 See Joan L. Larsen, Importing Constitutional Norms from a “Wider 
Civilization”: Lawrence and the Rehnquist Court’s Use of Foreign and International 
Law in Domestic Constitutional Interpretation, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1283, 1308–09 
(2004). 
216 See Alford, supra note 178, at 687–88 (“Thus, in this most global of media, 
not a single Justice expressed the view that foreign standards were somehow 
relevant to regulate sex on the Internet. As a constitutional matter, the 
contemporary community is anything but a global village.”). 
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admiralty or immigration law, it involves whether domestic law 
applied to inherently transnational conduct should borrow from 
foreign law. 
The fear of subjective application of international law can be 
assuaged.  As with the definition of “obscenity,” an objective or 
methodological approach informs analysis.  These fears are 
allayed by “limit[ing] the members of the world community 
whose opinions would ‘count.’ ”217  This has been countered by the 
notion of the difficulty inherent in such a process:  How can a 
court determine which foreign countries to “count”?218 
D. Objective Approach to Limiting Comparative Law Sources 
A court can determine which foreign countries to count by 
deference to studies and statistics, much like the use of surveys 
in Part III and Part IV.C.  There have been many studies 
recently regarding cultural differences across nations, 
quantifying and tabulated the differences for easy references.  
These can inform an obscenity inquiry.  For example, one could 
look to studies relating to sexual values219 and general cultural 
value studies.220  Notably, Professor Geert Hofstede’s Cultural 
Dimensions could prove to be very useful in guiding analysis 
because it is premised on the difference of cultural values.  In 
looking to foreign law to inform American cultural inquiry, 
limiting foreign sources to those that are similar to America 
culturally guards against the common criticisms of comparative 
analysis. 
In the Hofstede Study, first published in 1984, Hofstede 
developed five indices of cultural values: small versus large 
power distance; individualism versus collectivism; masculinity 
versus femininity; weak versus strong uncertainty avoidance; 
 
217 Larsen, supra note 215, at 1322. 
218 Id. at 1324. 
219 See David P. Schmitt et al., Why Can’t a Man Be More Like a Woman? Sex 
Differences in Big Five Personality Traits Across 55 Cultures, 94 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 168, 168–72 (2008) (analyzing the sexual differences in a sample of 
men and women across multiple countries through personality traits, cultural value 
indices—including the Hofstede Study,—gender equality indices, and socioeconomic 
indicators).  
220 See generally HOFSTEDE, supra note 27; David P. Schmitt et al, The 
Geographic Distribution of Big Five Personality Traits: Patterns and Profiles of 
Human Self-Description Across 56 Nations, 38 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 173 
(2007) (comparing personality traits across cultures). 
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and long versus short term orientation.221  These values were 
polled from various workers internationally.222  While these 
values do not relate explicitly to the ascertainment of “obscene,” 
they can be used to identify nations that have similar cultural 
values to the United States.  The Hofstede Study charts these 
values on an index and assigns numerical values to countries.  
Looking to the United States’ position in these various indices, 
one can then look to the closest one or two countries on both 
sides.  By compiling a list of countries in this manner, an 
objective guideline can inform comparative analysis.  This 
approach generates a list of countries that are culturally similar 
to the United through the use of a diverse field of different 
cultural value sets.  This method is limited, weeds out extreme 
outliers, and is disciplined in focus.  While the Hofstede Study 
approach may not be perfect, it is nonetheless substantially more 
guided and methodical than picking out of a hat or choosing 
“English speaking” countries.  At the very least, it is markedly 
more methodical than any approach the Supreme Court has used 
in creating binding law on the nation when looking to 
international law. 
The Hofstede Study values can be used to determine sexual 
values even more narrowly than its general application.  While 
the Hofstede Study values were not developed to examine sexual 
attitudes, it nevertheless could be used in considering a limiting 
application of comparative analysis.  Sexual attitudes are often 
rooted in cultural norms.223  Moreover, many of the index values 
are even closely enough related to sexuality to be delineated in 
the text, as in the case of the “power distance” index224 and 
masculinity-feminity.225  The values have been used elsewhere in 
sexual psychology research226 and are more objective than “nose 
counting.”  By analogy, published studies have correlated sexual 
 
221 See HOFSTEDE, supra note 27, at xix–xx. 
222 See id. at 41–43. 
223 Vipan K. Luthar & Harsh K. Luthar, Using Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions 
to Explain Sexually Harassing Behaviors in an International Context, 13 INT’L J. 
HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 268, 269 (2002) (noting that researchers theorize that 
sexual harassment is informed by cultural contexts). 
224 See HOFSTEDE, supra note 27, at 99 (noting that high-power distance indexed 
countries tend to be more lenient towards under-age sex). 
225 See id. at 329–30. 
226 Luthar & Luthar, supra note 223. 
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harassment to the Hofstede Study values.227  Noticing that the 
United States rates similarly to Canada, the Netherlands, and 
Great Britain on the individuality index,228 one could then limit a 
comparative analysis to those countries.  This can be done across 
all the indices to create a varied, yet precise, mode of analysis.  
Similar comparative studies on obscenity law have been 
conducted, such as comparing American obscenity law to 
Canadian law and finding that they are strikingly different.229  
For example, looking to Canadian law, one finds a similar 
“community standards” test but learns that Canada employs a 
“national” standard.230  Using the Hofstede Study to create a list 
for comparison, judges can objectively determine whether 
American obscenity law is just or out of line with identifiable 
contemporary standards. 
While this methodology may not be as precise as other 
applications of the Hofstede Study, this is only because 
Hofstede’s values do not include a pointed value like “prurient 
interest identifier.”  Barring a study tailor-made to the attitudes 
of cultures of online pornography, the benefits of the Hofstede 
Study are overwhelming.  Professor Hofstede used large numbers 
of people across a multitude of countries in his study, resulting in 
one of the most influential cross-cultural studies ever 
published.231  Moreover, the proposed application of the Hofstede 
Study is not to identify sexual values, but to find analogous 
countries on a macro-level.  The Hofstede Study is a reliable and 
practical method for amassing a list of countries with similar 
cultural values to America.   
 
 
227 See id. 
228 See HOFSTEDE, supra note 27, at 315. 
229 See Boyce, supra note 106, at 337–38. 
230 Justin A. Giordano, The United States Constitution’s First Amendment vs. 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: A Comparative Analysis of Obscenity 
and Pornography as Forms of Expression, 26 N.C. CENT. L.J. 71, 79–80 (2004). 
231 See Luthar & Luthar, supra note 223, at 272 (describing the value of the 
Hofstede Study); John W. Bing, Hofstede’s Consequences: The Impact of His Work on 
Consulting and Business Practices, ITAP INT’L, http://www.itapintl.com/ 
facultyandresources/articlelibrarymain/hofstedes-consequences-the-impact-of-his-
work-on-consulting-and-business-practices.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2012). 
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CONCLUSION 
Pornography and obscenity has changed significantly since 
the Supreme Court heard Miller v. California.  At the time, the 
Court delineated a workable solution to a problem that had 
plagued courts for years.  The emergence of the Internet as a 
global network, and its use as a primary method of delivering 
pornography, however, has dulled the applicability of Miller’s 
obscenity doctrine.  The use of “local community” standards is 
unreasonable and has resulted in unfair prosecutions and the 
chilling of free speech.  Recognizing this problem, the Ninth 
Circuit took an admirable step toward progress in applying a 
national standard to obscenity.  This approach, however, does 
little to reduce one of the largest problems with Miller: 
subjectivity.  Moreover, the national standard carries a 
definitional burden.  The “community standards” language 
should be eschewed in favor of the more flexible and objective 
“evolving standards of decency” test from the Eighth 
Amendment.  This test has proven workable in fields beyond the 
Eighth Amendment, such as sexual privacy. 
Under the “evolving standards” test, international law is 
often consulted.  To allay fears of subjective consultation, the 
Hofstede Study can be used to systematically approach 
international law.  As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once said: 
For the rational study of the law . . . the man of the future is the 
man of statistics and the master of economics. It is revolting to 
have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid 
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the 
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, 
and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.232   
The Supreme Court, while seemingly reluctant to consult 
international law for constitutional interpretation, has engaged 
in the practice frequently.  In the case of determining the 
standard for Internet obscenity, there is greater reason than 
perhaps ever to consult international law because the allegedly 
obscene material exists internationally.  It comes from 
international sources, goes to international sources, and travels  
 
 
 
232 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 
(1897) (emphasis added). 
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across international networks.  Echoing the words of Justice 
Holmes, statistics and rational methods can be used to guide the 
foray into international waters.   
Miller is patently outdated now and has been for quite some 
time.  Attitudes have changed since Miller, and many practices 
that were once taboos are no longer forbidden.  Nonetheless, 
pornographers must deal with the fear of being picked at any 
time for prosecution, and then subjected to the most restrictive 
standard in the nation.  While courts have been historically 
lethargic in adapting to technological and societal change, they 
can also serve as a catalyst for change.  The world of Miller is no 
more, and it is time to sever, judicially and philosophically, from 
at least the first part of the Cerberean antique that is its rule. 
 
